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_,'.INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND OPTIMAL GROWTH: 
·-.".THE CASE -OF OPEN· UNEMPLOYMENT* 
-Milind M. Lele James L. McCabe 
1liarbridge House, Inc. Yale University
Chicago, Illinois New Haven, Connecticut 
<ABSTRACT 
·".l'he investigation is based on a -dynamic, development-planning model 
-<Which assumes open unemployment --of unskilled labor. The standard devia­
,;:tion of capital holdings across households enters as a t\ltate variable and 
·£eeds back on the system through its effect -on demand composition and the 
-1.abor-intensity of the output mix. The system is controlled by varying 
~he average level and progressivity of taJCes and subsidies which depend 
;:on capital income. From this model, the behavior of summary measures of 
-,capital and income inequality-along a consumption-optimal trajectory is 
,Jdetermined. For example, conclusions are drawn concerning possibly diver­
gent changes in capital and income inequality and the relationship between 
-:these dispersion measures and output growth. Also investigated are changes 
~4n the marginal tax rate on income from human and non-human capital. 
*The authors are grateful to Professor Kenneth Arrow for helpful connnents 
and criticisms. 
.INTRODUCTION 
.Of late economists have focussed considerable attention on the rela­
1
et:ionship of income dispersion to questions relating to the general efficiency 
,;of resource allocation. A major area of concern has been the factor oppor­
.tunity cost effect [5]. It is contended that a reduction in income disper-
-.ion will increase the output share of commodities with low factor opportunity 
costs. So, it is argued, demand for goods which are intense in the relatively 
;abundant factors will rise, while the demand for goods intense in the rela­
-tively scarce factors will fall. 
'There i.s also the more traditional argument that a more even distribu­
tion of income causes a decline in the aggregate savings rate, thereby retard­
--d.ng growth. (See [ 9 ], [14], [16] .) This is open to question. there is 
<1ittle doubt that the marginal propensity to save out of corporate profits 
:is greater than that out of wage income. But, to some extent, the associa­
.,tlon of income dispersion with the rate of c-.apital formation is based on the 
:assumption that the household marginal propensity to save varies either with 
"the kind or the level of income earned. these are points of considerable 
:empirical and theoretical disagreement, as indicated in [6], [7] and [8). 
Moreover, even if the marginal propensity to save did change as hypothesized, 
the reduction in private savings could be offset by increases in tax revenues 
.;;and public savings. 
Amore important theoretical question, not considered hitherto, is: 
--rowhat extent can increases in the capital-labor ratio affect the size dis­
tribution of income in economies where a shortage of capital has led to con­
siderable open unemployment? 
1In this paper we use the term 'dispersion• as a measure of inequities in the 
distribution of the variable under discussion. 
2 
This paper is confined to examining the.factor opportunity cost effect 
and the interaction of capital accumulation with employment and income dis­
persion. The existing literature utilizes closed economy models which assume 
full employment; further, it considers income distribution by kind (e.g. 
· relative factor shares) rather than size. In these respects, our paper repre­
sents a significant· departure from ex:l.sting work. We consider the case of 
labor surplus economies_, where income redistribution appears to be a parti­
cularly crucial policy objective. Open unemployment is assured in our system 
through an institutionally-determined floor on the minimum real wage. Finally, 
the closed economy assumption is abandoned, and we utilize the static rela-
tionships
2 
between income dispersion and other macroeconomic variables derived 
elsewhere [13]. 
On the basis of these assumptions, we are able to obtain a description 
of the changes in capital intensity and capital (and income) dispersion in 
the context of consumption-optimal growth theory. A noteworthy feature of 
our formulation is the absence of any assumptions regarding the form of the 
income and capital distribution _functions, beyond the requirement of a finite 
second moment. 
The steady state equil:fhrium solution of the problem exhibits various_ 
interesting characteristics. In particular, we are able to demonstrate the 
existence of situations wherein income equity and a more even distribution 
of assets are not consistent objectives. In these cases, for example, de­
creases in the level and distribution of capital and in the employment rate 
are accompanied by increases in income dispersion. Alternatively, should 
the employment rate fall as capital intensity increases, paradoxical situations 
2
These relationships are obtained in [13] as simple extensions of the type
of rigid-wage trade model described by Brecher (3]. 
.3 
111ay well arise iri which increasing ,capital -·causes further inequities in i.n­
:-:.come distribution despite a more even ,distribution -of -,capital holdings.. We 
~..also show that consumption-optimal program associated -with a decrease in 
,human and non-human capital dispersion ,(as ·111easured by the coefficient of 
·variation) may well imply a lower ·marginal tax rate. 
Dynamic equations describing the· change of capital intensity and capital 
cdispersion are derived in Section I. Section :11 outlines the main arguments 
in the derivation of a production-demand ·r.elationship, ·which relates output 
·ct:o capital -intensity and dispersion. This is an important prerequisite to 
-,any considerations of optimal growth, inasmuch as capital and income disper­
·Sion have a significant impact on output through demand composition. Equi-
·· librium conditions are obtained in Sectio~-IIl and IV under alternative assump­
,tions regarding the form of the consumption function. The concluding section 
-~mines the policy and growth implications of our model. 
•J:. THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM 
It will be convenient to assume that the economy is divided into m 
:groups of varying size but growing at the same rate. i'he capital (human and 
~-human) of a household is assumed to be spread evenly among its heirs; 
itbe number of heirs is assumed to be the same for each household, so that 
·the capital holdings of each of the households within ·a group remain 
-equalized • 
Assuming a total population of m groups whose household are growing 
-;at rate n , let us define the following quantities ~!!_representative 
household in the group: 
4 
. -
A(1.1) cj = consumption 
fl" 
(1.2) sj = savings 
(1.3) kj =fl capital stock (including human capital) 
wj ~ wage income of unskilled labor assumed allocated 
completely to consumption 
(1.5) nj ~ capital income before taxes and subsidies 
(1.6) zj = ·disposable capital income. 
Then we have savings, s. equal to the rate of change of capital, i.e. 
J 
(1.7) s = gross changes in capital stock.j 
But 
(1.8) sj = total disposable income-consumption= zj + wj - cj ~ 
We assume that the function determining the consumption per household of 
ththe j group is of the form 
(1.9) 
where 
i.e. all unskilled wage income--which is untaxed--and a constant fraction 
of capital income are allocated completely to consumption. The effects 
on optimal growth results of relaxing the assumption that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of unskilled wage income is unity and that out 
of disposable capital income zero are considered later in the paper. 
:s 
· ·------··-The· expression for savings sj now becomes, £r-om (1.7) and (1.8) 
-(1.10) 
Denote aggregate domestic savings per household by s, disposable capital 
i.ncome by z, and capital stock per household by k. Then, from (1.9) 
,ve obtain the following aggregate savings function 
-(L.11) :s-=z-Ok. 
--Xhen from (1.8) assuming a constant (exponential) depreciation rate ~ 
-~nd a rate of household growth n, 'We ·have 
-cdk • 
(L,12) ..-.l. = net change in capital stock per household
cdt 
th
bid . 1ev e h -household by 
'-Taxes are assessed only on capital income, which includes the income of 
.$killed labor. We now have 
_;Denote taxes (net of su s ies ) id on t e J· NTj • 
--Tk - NT
j j 
~where r is the return to capital (assumed constant). 
-One possible tax function is 
(1.14) NT = a" + a" (TI - TI)
j - 0 1 j 
-where n is the mean capital income per household for the entire society. 
"This can be written as 
6 
(1 ..15) NT = a"+ a"r(k - k)j O 1 j • 
The coefficient a0 determines the revenue impact of the tax, while a1 
determines the redistributive effects. 
From ('1.13), (1.15), equation (1.12) can be written as 
(1.16) 
Define aggregate quantities as below 
6 1 m 
(1 .. 17) k = -N !: k.N. , 
j=l J J 
thN = total number of households, Nj = the number of households in the j 
group, and m is the number of groups 
2 l m 2 
(1.18) a = N t N. (kj - k) 
j=l J 
where k is the weighted average of capital per household in each group 
and a2 is the weighted variance. We have, assuming an exponential growth 




These are the basic dynamic equations describing the manner in which capital 
;_-fntensity and capital dispersion vary ,over time. Note that, in the deriva­
,tion of these equations, no assumptions have been made regarding the form 
'°f the distribution of kj • It is only necessary that the quantities in 
·(1.17) and (1.18) exist. 
n. THE PRODOCTION-DEMAND RELATIONSH:t;:P 
"'The effects of income or asset distribution on the level of output 
,are generally excluded from consideration in the literature on consumption­
.. ~ptimal growth. Such effects, it is felt, are negligible and of little 
---consequence in the determination of the -·steady-state equilibrium solutions 
:£or the economic models usually considered. 
:;Inasmuch as we are interested in-examining the impact of changes 
.;in capital intensity on income dispersion through its effect upon the 
"~mployment rate, we must therefore consider possibility that changes in 
,dispersion feed back on employment, however small the magnitude of this 
effect. This closes the causal chain and permits us to formulate a well­
::posed problem. 
:We shall make the following assumptions; these can be eased con­
,siderably as shown in [ 13]. 
Al: There are two connnodities in the system. Connnodity 1 is used for 
·both investment and consumption. Connnodity (or good) 2 is used for 
-consumption only. 
-A2: The production functions for the two connnodities are differentiable 
·4Ild homogeneous of degree one, with unskilled labor and capital being 
the factors of production. 
A3: Commodity 2 is more labor intensive compared to Counnodity 1. 
8 
A4: Open unemployment exists in the system even in equilibrium; either 
the minimum real wage is (exogenously) specified or the rental rate 
on capital is determined by prices in the international market. Each 
household has one laborer (either skilled or unskilled). 
AS: All government tax revenues are expended on Commodity 1. 
3
_and, provisionally 
A6: A closed economy. 
From AS, we see that the total expenditure on Commodity 1, per 
household, other than private consumption, is determined by 
G + i = (r - a)k1 
6where G government expenditure per household 
i ~ gross investment per household 
and r =6 rental rate on capital (expressed in terms of good 1).1 
"lb.is expression indicates that the sum of investment and government expen-
diture depends only on the capital intensity. k, since and a are 
specified. Consequently, the only relevant changes in output mix are those 
effected by changes in the composition of private consumer demand. Since 
good 2 is labor intensive relative to good 1 (A3), these changes in the 
bill of goods demanded will influence the level of aggregate output and 
The closed economy assumption (A6) has been introduced only to simplify 
the exposition of the general equilibrium analysis. It is abandoned later 
The detailed analysis, with trade included, is presented in [13]. 
9 
employment. The importance of capital dispersion as a variable affecting 
growth therefore depends on its relationship to the composition of consumer 
demand. 
We will therefore first derive expressions for the aggregate commodity 
demand functions. We will then solve a general equilibrium model to deter­
mine the employment rate and capital intensity, as well as the relative 
shares of the two goods, when demand equals supply. Solution of the 
general equilibrium system will yield expressions for the GDP per laborer 
(y) and the employm~nt rate (e) in terms of the capital intensity (k) , 
and the dispersion of capital (c) • 
The Commodity Demand Functions 
Aggregate private consumption per household for Commodity i may 




is the standard deviation of the distribution and P is the 
commodity-price ratio (good 2 to good 1). Exact derivations of the func-
tional form of (2.2) exist in the case of the quadratic and the exponential 
demand functions for the individual household. See Klein [3]. Substituting 
the aggregate version of (1.9) in (2.2) we have 
(2.3) 
Well-behaved household demand functions relating consumption of good i 
to expenditure are monotone over the range being considered, and pass 
10 
through the origin•. It can be shown that the expenditure elasticities 
are greater than (less than) unity according as the functions are convex 
(concave) to the origin. Denoting the expenditure elasticity of demand
Ath thof the ~ household for the i commodity by 'l'li
l 
, we have 
~Ci>
(2.4) a;-< 0 according as 
C 
i.e., according as the household's commodity demand functions are convex 
or concave. 
The standard deviation of consumption c is related to measures
C 
of income dispersion through the variance-covariance matrix of the joint 
distribution of household capital holdings and employment. (Every house­
:hold is assumed to face the same wage rate for unskilled labor.) The 
unskilled labor employment rate of a particular household may well be an in­
creasing function of its capital stock, particularly if family enterprises 
,exist. However, for simplicity, we make the assumption 
A7: Employment of unskilled labor is distributed independently of capital 
holdings and the employment rate of skilled labor remains fixed at unity. 
This implies that the household unskilled employment rate is independent 
of capital holdings and is binomially distributed. (From A4, workers are 
either employed or unemployed.) Finally, we make the crucial assumption 
A8: The ratio of skilled to unskilled laborers (and thus the distribution 
of human capital) is fixed. 
This assumption is similar to one made by Sheshinsky [16) except that the 
fixed skill distribution implies a fixed human capital distribution in our 
v 
11 
2,-.model, but not in his. Under these conditions, aw , the variance of un-
;akilled wage income per household is seen to be 
(2.5) ,,2 • w2l{e
w 






(sum of the weighted (weighted variance 
variances of of unskilled wage 
-Unskilled income income between 
within groups) groups) 
,where w1 is the wage rate in terms of ~o~ 1, -e is the ratio -of unskilled 
.laborers employed to total households,-X-£{0,1) is the·fixed ratio of unskilled to 
total laborers, and e is the unskilled employment rate. This u 
expression is derived from the total variance formula for two mutually­
-exclusive groups•-households with skilled and households with unskilled 
.labor. Denote average capital per household for the unskilled-labor group 
by k and the variance of household consumption by a 2 • then, by means u . C 
,of the total-variance formula for grouped data, we obtain,from the household 
. ,,consumption function and (2.5) ! 
(2.6) 
:Given the function for capital accumtlation of a representative household 
the percentage change in Ck: - k)2 can be shown to be the same as the u 
percentage change in a2 • 1.'his implies that Ck: - k) is a fixed pro-u 
portion of a. Thus (2.6) may be rewritten as 
(2.7) 
where -1 < ~ < 0 • We assuae 
12 
2
(2.8a) implying ~oec 2: 0 
and 
2
(2.8b) • 5 2 < e ~1'\ implying ao-oec < 0 •=e"',
(1 - t3 )')... u 
We can therefore write (2.3) in the form 
(2.9) Ci = c"(k P a, e)i ' ' 
with 
. ~Ci
(2.10) aa"'~o if ,,.ti >- 1 
~
(2.11) -1:. > 0 if Ci> 0~ 
(in the case of a quadratic demand function). 
Demand and Supply Equilibrium 
How, then, do changes in the standard deviation of the distribution 
of capital, (1 , affect the demand curve and the equilibrium point? Assume. 
that the expenditure elasticity of good 1, 111 
J, 
is greater than unity and 
.t 2that 112 < 1 and that ooc /oo > 0. Then a reduction in the household 
asset dispersion from a• to 0'11 (a" < 0' 1 ) will cause the demand curve 
D2D1 
4to shift towards good 2 as shown in Figure 2. This is seen from 
Note that each point on D2D1 represents a fixed asset dispersion O', 
but a different wage,...income distribution due to changes in unskilled employ­
ment per household e. 
:(2.10). 'lb.e equilibrium point will shift upwards along the ·transformation 
cSurface (from 1 to 2); this transformation -surface is linear because -of ,the 
0 Specified factor price.. The new equilibrium point, 2, will represent a 
-higher level of GNP per household and a higher unskilled employment per 
~ household, e , than those attained at point 1.5 
By solving such a system we may derive expressions for the GNP per 
:OOusehold (y) and average unskilled employment per household 
0(2.12) ·'Y = f (k, a; 8) 
(2.13) -e -= g(k, a; 8) 
,where 8 is the exogenously specified factor price expressed in terms of 
-,one -of the goods. Noting that y = r l k + w1e , we have 
-(.2.. 14) 
.and 
·(2.15) as 2K > 0ok < 
were is the rental rate on capital and w the wage rate in termsr 1 1 
1:>f good 1. 
From the equilibrium analysis carried out above, we see that, as 
•long as a lies above the point where ocr /ocr = o. 
C 
~1< 
according as --oocr > 
C 
:i.e., 
1ntroducing trade into model does not affect the qualitative results, pro­




'& ~ ..,t ~ 1(2.16) aa' = ~ ~ 0 according as '11 > • 
If ~ /'?n = 0 , then "de/oo = 0 • 
C 
The compatibility of output and employment objectives implied by 
(2.14) and (2.15) may well break down when the good intensive in unskilled 
labor is inferior. In this situation, under certain conditions, og/ok 
i_s J'.legative and increases in capital intensity may cause employment to 
decline even as GDP per household increases. The details are presented 
in McCabe [13] • 
III. EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH J.>ATHS 
Denoting total consumption (both private and public) by 
A 
C , in-
stantaneous welfare .is given by 
(3.1) U(c) = Nu(c) 
a" ,. _Q_
C = f(k,a) - r k - + ak1 rl 
~· 
where u(~) determines aggregate utility per household. The possible 
effects of changes in expenditure distribution on social welfare are not 
6considered in this function. We are concentrating on the analysis of 
possible growth-equity conflicts along a consumption-optimal growth path. 
Then the optimal growth paths are those that maximize discounted 
future consumption per household, i.e., the quantity 
T T 
A A(3.2) · Se -pt:N0entu(c)dt = J e -rtU(c)dt 0 0 
6 since the connnodity price ratio is fixed, private consumption (in terms 
of good 1) is treated as a single good; public and private consumption 
expenditures are perfectly substitutable in this function. 
15 
-were p is the rate of social discount, n is the rate of household growth 
,:(size constant), 7 ( • p-n ) ·the net -rate of social discount, N is the
0 
·:initial number of households and T is the planning horizon--assumed finite 
for simplicity. 
Thus the paths of optimal capital accumulation and dispersion are 
;given by the solution of the following optimal control problem: 
T 




- .. r (k - u ) - (n + o: + &)k-dt 1 1 
<and the constraints 




tlere u and u , the control variables have been defined as (equation
1 2 
(1.20)). 
(3.10) 1 - a"u2 "" 1 • 
16 
The upper bound on given in (3.7) is obtained from (2.1), as grossu1 
investment per household has to exceed zero [G = a"]0 • The lower bound 
on given in (3.8) takes note of the fact that government expenditures 
are non-negative. The lower bound, A, ensures that the marginal net 
tax rate a1 will be less than unity, thereby retaining the incentive 
to save. Restrictions such as (3.9) must also be placed on the control 
variables to ensure that no household is taxed more than its gross capital 
. 7 .. - . . - - - - - .. 
income. Although such control constraints may be binding durint the transition 
to an equilibrium point, theywill no1: affect the values of k and a o ree an opti­
mal steady-state has been attained. As for the state constraints, the lower 
bound on k is determined by the product of a proportionality constant (the 
value.of skilled laborer's human capital) and (1-).); that on a by the product 
.of the same constant and 1).(1-).). 
The above optimal control problem is linear in the controls ~ 
and ; thus the opt:inial policies will be of the ''bang-singular-bang"u2 
type [ 4, pp. 261-265], i.e., the control variables will move between their 
boundary values and an interior value(s) corresponding to the singular arc(s). 
We will only consider the case where, for all feasible values of 
k and 
~f(k,cr) <(3.11) 000' . • 
7From expressions (3.17) and (3.18) derived later in the text, it is clear 
that this condition will always hold as an equality in steady-state equi­
librium. In situations where k is rising and er is falling, this 
constraint will not be binding. However, if k is falling, the lower 
bound on disposable income may dominate the upper bound on- u , derived1 
from the non-negativity constraint on gross investment. In any case, 
our main qualitative results will not be altered, provided, as is the 
case in the problem being considered, the transition to the optimal steady 
state always implies a decline in u •2 
l.7 
'The function f(k,a) is only concave 1£ the output share of the labor­
·mtensive good declines as k -increases fl3]. Denote the undiscounted 
.-costate variables by ¾c .and A.a -respectively; then the Hamiltonian has 
::the form 
{3.12) 
Then the optimality conditions yield ([4]_, pp. 261-265) 
an· (3.13) - = 0 = U • r - r • A..
®:l C 1 1 ·1c 
<(3.14) 
(3.15) 
h addition, we have the dynamics which are given by (3.4) and (3.5). 
--~ equilibrium, k = a= ~ = $..er = 0 • This gives 
{3..17) u -= {1l 
{3.18) 
Bote that -n + ~ + a/r > A for a steady-state to exist. Since > 01 r 1 
-and er > 0 [from (3.5), (3.8) and T < m), 
18 
(3 .19) >,. = 0 a 
(3.20) 
The two remaining variables k and a can be obtained from (3.15) and (3.16) 
. (3 .21) of (k, a) n + 6 + -, = p + e.Ok = u 
of(k,a)(3 .22) 00' = 0 • 
Given that gk > 0, condition (3.21) will hold only if the net social 
rate of discount (r) exceeds the private rate of return (r ) , from (2.17).
1 
Otherwise, gk must be negative. This may well be the case, as indicated 
in Section II, if commodity 2 is inferior at the equilibrium point. Since 
£ < 0 by assumption, (3.22) cannot hold. The constrained optimum value of
0 
a is given by the lower bound !!. • The optimum value of k is given by 
(3.21) at a point where a=!!..8 By comparing these turnpike values of k 
and a with the initial conditions, the direction of change of these vari­
ables along the optimal trajectory may be established. 
A/3 yet we have not determined the standard deviation of the distribu-
thtion of income. Total income for the j household, is given by 
""yj = net capital income and wage income 
a r 1kj - NTj + fj . 
From the formula for the variance of grouped data, we have from (2 .5) and (3 .18) 
(3.24) 
8Writing the dynamic equation for a as below 
da/a = [r1u2 -a - n - 6]dt 
we see that since will be at its lower bound, a will decline to au2 
at a constant rate. 
19 
......---······ 
With CJ greater than or equal to its optimum value, it can be shown that 
~ furthe-r, if 00' !'?Z < 0 , ·then oCfA/oe < 0 • 
C y 
·We can now plot the movement of key target variables along the 
"'Optimal trajectory. For the case gk > 0 (neither good inferior), the 
(j,. , the--curves of constant GDP per household, employment rate and y 
,9 
'-standard deviation of the distribution of -after-tax income are as shown 
{for a specified equilibrium point (k*,cfk) ) in Figure 3. The behavior 
CJA, -e and GDP per household along·,,of the various quantities k , (j , y 
the optimal trajectory clearly depends upon the _location of the initial 
-values of k and a (say) , r:r0 • This is summarized in Table 1k0 
;for the cases where c > c1t-= ~ ·•0 
,-From Table 1 it is clear that, in the case when gk > 0 , · equity 
,and growth are always consistent objectives, in the sense that increases 
.in k do not bring about increases in the dispersion of after-tax income, 
,as measured by aA. However, it is worth noting that in Region III, where y 
k and CJA both decline, CJA may well decline more slowly, especially
y y 
-so, since the employment rate ~e , is tending to reverse this decline. 
1n this situation, the income dispersion as measured by the coefficient 
of variation r:rA/y may increase.lo. 
y 
~-.:_ 
GDP c: constant-= :k gk > 0(*)GDP= (1 + gk ~)gO' 
. '-'"-'-·e = constant = (dt)....= jgk/scl 
gk 1(1 = constant-= = 8>0(:~)yy gO' i+e 
20 
TABLE l 
Region k (j GDP -e (1 A y 
I @ © © 0 
II 0 0 © 0 @ increasing 
-
III 0 0 0 G 0 decreasing 
IV 0 •'/ 0 0 © 
In the case when gk < 0, owing (say) to the good intensive in 
unskilled labor being inferior, the location of the level curves is for 
the most part reversed, as shown in Figure 4. The behavior of the key 
variables is sutmnarized in Table 2. Here, growth and equity are not con-
sistent objectives over a significant portion of the (k,cr) plane. In 
Region IV, a,. is unequivocally increasing as k increases. Thus, while y 
capital intensity is increasing, GDP per laborer, the employment rate and 
income equity are decreasing. In Regions II and III, there may exist situ-
ations where y is declining faster than this dispersion, as measured 
by the coefficient of variation, is increasing along with k and 
possibly GDP per household. 
The expression for aggregate disposable income per household in steady-




Region k a GDP -~ e a.. 
y 














6 = increasing 
6'= decreasing 
IV © 0 0 @ 
IV. THE CASE OF A KEYNESIAN SAVmcs FUNCTION 
The model in the form presented thus far is based on the assumption 
-'that the marginal propensity to save out of unskilled labor income is zero. 
I ./ 
This assumption implies that ~ par changes in capital per household between 
steady states will affect neither a nor the slope r(l - u ) and intercept2 
{ru r(l - u )k] of the tax function. On the other hand, if the marginal1 - 2 
-~opensity to save out of unskilled wage income were positive, an increase 
in capital per household would cause the savings of poorer households to in­
crease and the variance of capital per household to decline. To keep a 
-constant, a higher marginal tax rate would be required. 
kt us analyze this effect formally and show the existence of a steady 
4tate optimal program in the case of a Keynesian savings function. 
Suppose that the savings function for a representative household 
th
:in the j group takes the form 
(4.1) 
22 
j thwhere yj is the total gross income of the household and NTj is 
the net taxo Then the change in the capital per household of the j th 
group will be determined by the relationship 
(4.2) 
Let us assume that a0 is held constant and government savings per house-
hold, s , is controlled instead. Then the accumulation equation forg ..




is private capital per household assumed equal to k 
11 
and
er= ao + alaO. The percentage change in the variance of total capital 
is given by the following expression (provided each household receives 
the same amount of capital from the government): 
where ku is average private capital per household for the unskilled-labor 
group. The expression for the percentage change in (k - k) is given byu p 
• 
11 ,.. The simplifying assumption that k = k makes sense if government savingsp
finances public investments (e.g., connnuter transport) yielding free services
otherwise obtained through purchased durables such as automobiles. 
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It can be shown that a stable equilibrium, independent of a1 , will be 
attained where the percentage change in a 2 is equal to the percentage 
change in (k - k )2 • This will occur where u p 
(k -k >2 
(4.6) (1/A - 1) = ____u___,,2,...P_. 
" 
Therefore, with (k - k ) = -(1/A - 1>112•" , we may write u . p 
(4.7) 
The sum of government expenditure plus private savings is given 
by the relationship 
. (4.8). 
where is the fixed value of a" where s p is private savings per0 , 
household and C g is government consumption per household. Define the 
control variables as 
If all the expenditures on the left-hand side of (4.8) are included in 
the final demand for the same good, then a function determining average 
unskilled employment per household from k and u
2
a may be derived in 
a manner similar to the one outlined in Section II. With 
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and the dynamics given by (4.3) and (4.7), the steady-state optimum solu-· 
tion involves the modified golden-rule condition and an equation 
(4.9) 
· 12which only give the optimum value of the product u2•a. From the steady 
state equilibrium expression for 
--
derived from (4.7),u2 
(4.10) 
, 
·~ - 13 
it can be shown that 
·The condition (4.9)is obtained from the optimality condition 
by proving that "--- = Uc and A~= 0. The equality between A.. and·1c V --k UC 
is obvious from the condition 
It follows from the optimality condition oH/ou2 = 0 that, if A.. = u ,-le - C 
The adjoint equation multiplied by (1/u ) may be written as2 
aJi/oa(l/u } = Ucg + AO'{a r ~ w g (1/A- l)l/21 - A.a (~~z) = O •2 2 1 1 1 2 
Substituting the expression for g Uc into this equation yields2 
~ = 0 if (n+5+7) > O • 
u2 -
13 -
Multiplying both sides of (4.10) by a yields 
1)112w1g(k, u2a)(l/A -
O' + ---------------'1_r1 
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Thus, a will tend to decline along the optimal trajectory until (4.11) 
is met. From (4.10) it is clear that the effect of a change in the steady-
state value of ~ e is given by 
(4.12) 
If 82 < 0, then· Q > -1 and '?f:/'ok > 0 as gl <> 0 . The change in 
i,. < 
"t:be steady-state equilibrium value of ~ e with respect to (1 is simply 
~g2, which is assumed to be negative. Since k · and a affect the 
ateady-state value of ~ e in the same manner as they did in Section III 
wen gk > 0 or gk < 0, the relative slopes of the level curves in 
·the (k,a) plane will be qualitatively similar to those shown in Figures 
3 and 4, and the value of the absolute slopes will be positive if gk > 0 
and negative if ~ < 0. 
By differentiating this equation totally with respect to a and u2c:, · And rearranging, we obtain 
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It is possible in this variant of the model for the coefficients of 
variation of both capital and capital income to decline from one steady-state 
equilibrium to another, even though the marginal tax rate decreases. From 
(4.11), it is clear that, if a= ak = a
0 
, an increase in k from one 
. steady-state equilibrium to another will cause to increase, implyingu2
a lower marginal tax rate. Given that v(a,k) is concave and ♦ (c,O) = 0 , 
the elasticity of u
2a with respect to k will be less than unity. There­
fore, coefficient of variation of disposable income will decrease as its 
mean level rises. The intercept of the tax function a0-r 1k(l - u2 ) will 
also decrease. In our system this implies both first-order and Lorenz do­
mination shifts [l, 15] in the distribution of disposable capital income, 
as well as unskilled wage income, as k rises. In general, the closer the 
initial value of a is to its lower bound and the more falls shortk0
of its optimal value, the more likely it i~ that the optimal steady-state 
will involve a lower marginal tax rate and a more even distribution 
disposable than the initial one. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have developed a normative model for the size dis­
tribution of capital and income dispersion, essentially free of assumptions 
regarding the underlying distributions. We proceeded to examine the impact 
of taxes and subsidies upon capital intensity, capital and income dispersion, 
employment rate and GDP per household, along consumption-optimal growth paths. 
We found cases in which growth and income equity were not consistent objec­
tives; in these cases, decreases in the level and distribution of capital 
and in the employment rate are accompanied by increases in ipcome dispersion. 
Alternatively, in situations where increasing capital intensity lowers the 
employment rate, there were cases wherein increasing output causes further 
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.:inequities in income distribution despite a more even distribution of capital 
·J10ldings. The inverse relationship between the employment rate and capital 
·intensity can exist under the assumptions made only in the case where the 
-relatively labor-intensive good is inferior. Nonetheless, the pattern of 
growth, .in which increases in capital intensity are associated with a decline 
in the employment rate and a rise in income•inequity has been observed in a 
uumber of countries during the early stages of development, as indicated in 
12) and [ 12] • 
Ve demonstrate that, given a positive margina~- propensity to save out 
.iof -unskilled wage income an increase in the disposable income of the poorest 
household may well be associated with a lower marginal tax rate if the optimal 
-:Steady-state k rises. This association arises because change in the mar­
~inal tax rate is necessary to satisfy a positive lower bound on capital 
inequality (due to assumed differences in human capital absorbtion), not 
1>ecause the marginal t~ rate has a direct effect on aggregate capital accu-
. 14 
.mulation. 
"The major assumption, explicitly stated in Section III, is that 
4/?x, < 0 , implying that the income elasticity of good 1, the capital­
intensive good, is greater than unity, with 1\ > ~ and 'J'2 < 1 and that 
:the Engel curve is non-linear. Only in these cases [14] is f (k, er) concave 
-and the optimal control problem well-posed. We do not feel that these are overly 
restrictive conditions, inasmuch as all that is required is that gcr be 
negative,however small it may be in magnitude. It is also consistent with 
the observed historical trend that, in most economies, output share of 
· 
Sheshinsky [16] presents a model in which a-decrease in the marginal tax 
rate has a direct positive effect on aggregate capital accumulation and under 
~ertain conditions, tends to arise disposable incpme of the poorest persons 
in the population. 
14 
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:industrial (capital-intensive) sector goes up while that of agricultural 
(~abor-intensive) sector goes down. 
A similar optimal control problem can be derived from a neo-classical 
system like that of Stiglitz [17], in which real wage flexibility ensures 
full employment. In this case, national income will be independent of de 
mand composition and hence of capital.dispersion. But if a is assumed 
to affect social welfar_e directly, the alternative model will produce quali­
tative results quite similar to ours. 
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